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Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian
Revolution in 1956
István Janek
In 1956, the Czechoslovak authorities successfully suppressed all traces of a potential
uprising. It can be stated that peace was not seriously disturbed in both the Czech
and the Slovak territories, and no significant movement took place. The Czechoslovak
society was not yet prepared for a political turn-over in the 50’s. The cautious change
of direction in 1953 and the economic reforms had borne their fruits by 1956, which
prevented the spread of the revolution to Czechoslovakia. The pull and let go tactic
of the authorities worked. Czechoslovakia pulled through the critical year of 1956 and
she got stronger. Slovak Hungarians could choose between their survival as a minority
and an uprising in autumn 1956. A sober deliberation excluded all steps leading to a
Hungarian revolution. The Slovak Hungarians still had vivid memories of suffering,
which they experienced after 1945. Worries of being accused of irredentism were strong
and any support of Hungarian revolution was unthinkable.
[Czechoslovakia; Hungarian Revolution; 1956; minority question; Soviet Union; bilat-
eral relations]
Introduction
Parliamentary electionswere held in Czechoslovakia on 30th May 1948.
Citizens could vote only for the united list of the National Front led
by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC). This list received
89.2 % of all votes. Those who disagreed with the united list threw a
blank slip in the poll box. Among the Hungarians, only the re-Slovak-
ized citizens were allowed to vote. President Beneš did not sign the
new constitution and resigned in protest (he explained his resignation
with his poor health). Klement Gottwald was elected new president
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and Antonín Zápotocký became the new Prime Minister. Czechoslo-
vakia lost its sovereignty; it became one of Stalin’s satellite states, but
it did not cut all economic connections with the western powers. Its
special position was also shown by the fact that the Red Army did
not station troops in the country due to the fact that Czechoslovakia
was one of the early allies of the USSR.1 After the change of regime,
the highest political institutions (presidential office, parliament and
government) got under Communist control. The Communists used
political terror: they began the liquidation of their opponents and
encouraged nationalisation in economy. Centralisation further
strengthened after 1948. The Communist leadership considered Slo-
vak national institutions dangerous, and hindered their efforts to gain
independence.2 In 1948, the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS)
merged into the CPC and got under the control of Prague. Although
they retained the name CPS and the Slovakian party organisation also
remained existent, their power and influence was significantly re-
duced: they became weak executive bodies. The Communist Party,
similarly to other countries, started the creation of the new system
with political cleansing. Politically active members of the civil parties
of the previous regime were now regarded as criminals and ‘traitors’
and they were ostracised. Middle class and higher-rank people were
considered as outcasts and their property was confiscated. Parallel to
the purges, they started the construction of the legal system, the polit-
ical institutions and economic fundaments of the party state. They
maximised land property in 50 ha. Farmers who did not want to
join the cooperatives or who failed to meet the compulsory delivery
requirements became outcasts as well. Economic leadership gradu-
ally shifted to the Communists; the majority of the population were
soon employed by the state. Communists formed action committees
which started widespread cleansing among the workers. Leading po-
sitions were filled by Communists often without any qualifications;
party membership was the primary requirement. At the 9th congress
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the construction of Social-
ismwasmarked as the main target of social development, and the first
five-year plan was launched accordingly. Foreign policy was adjusted
1 R. J. CRAMPTON, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and after, London – New
York 1994, p. 270.
2 Ibidem.
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to that of the USSR. On 25th January 1949, Czechoslovakia joined the
COMECON, which united the satellite states in the Soviet Bloc. This
guaranteed that these states became economically subordinated to the
USSR. The organisation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 strengthened this
situation.
The Communists put churches under state control in Czechoslo-
vakia in 1949. With the help of the State Security Office, they dis-
solved male monastic orders in 1950 and allowed only those female
orders to exist which did some social mission. Several bishops were
imprisoned, nine priests were put to show trials, and received sen-
tences of 10–25 years. The Archbishop of Prague, J. Beran, was put
under custody. An era of political trials began in accordance with
Stalin’s expectations. Several show trials took place from 1950 on-
wards. In 1952, the former General Secretary of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party, Rudolf Slánský was sentenced to death and exe-
cuted shortly after his removal. Several of his fellows received death
or long prison sentences. Besides Slánský, the former Czechoslovak
Foreign Minister, Vladimír Clementis was also executed. Until 1953,
233 people were sentenced to death in show trials and 178 people were
executed. The State Security Office developed its network of agents to
find the centres and the people of a possible resistance. The mone-
tary reform of the government in 1953 turned many Communists and
workers against the government. Many had lost a part of their sav-
ings. Although rationing was abolished real wages also decreased,
which led to smaller protests and clashes. Several industrial centres in
the Czech territories saw such protests. The authorities, out of fear of
anti-government movements, lowered prices, in several steps in 1953–
1955. Especially industrial products and some food became cheaper.
The compulsory delivery amounts were decreased to one-fifth, the
census of kulaks was suspended and special taxes were abolished.
Reprisals against workers who had appeared in strikes were also sus-
pended. Amnesty was declared giving a chance for the ‘deceived’
people. Arrangements to calm down the masses proved to be success-
ful.3 After the death of Stalin, the authorities became more lenient and
excessive measures happened less frequently. The Communist party
was reorganised: the formerly so self-confident leadership became
3 K. KAPLAN, Cˇeskoslovensko v letech 1953–1966, 3. cˇást, Praha 1992, p. 31.
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uncertain after the death of Gottwald.4 In 1953, Prime Minister An-
tonín Zápotocký became President, Antonín Novotný (who was also
President in 1957–1968) became General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the CCP, and Viliam Široký became PrimeMinister. The Cen-
tral Committee of the CCP decided, in honour of Gottwald, that the
presidential chair of the party would not be occupied any more, and
the highest positionwill be the General Secretary. In themeantime, the
Slovak civil nationalist group, led by Gustáv Husák, became increas-
ingly isolated within the party. Political trials continued even after the
death of Stalin. Leaders of the Slovakian Communist Party Gustáv
Husák and Daniel Okáli were imprisoned after a show trial.5 This trial
had an anti-Slovak attitude: Prague eliminated, as a preventive mea-
sure, the members of the Slovak National Council who supported the
‘federal model’. They wanted to prevent the Slovak question, which
threatened with succession, from getting to the agenda again. Prague
handled the Slovak question as an economic rather than a national
affair. The main problem was that the Czech territory was more de-
veloped than Slovakia. With the economic recovery programme the
Slovak question was successfully postponed. The 10th Congress of the
CCP decreased the accelerated pace of investment in July 1954, and
they designated stabilisation and raising the living standard as new
objectives. The ambiguity of the Czechoslovak leadership was shown
by the erection of the Stalin statue in Prague in 1955; it was carried
away in 1962. The Hungarian leadership, after having asked and re-
ceived help from the USSR, Poland and Romania, decided to turn to
Czechoslovakia for economic assistance in order to pull the country
out of recession. The Hungarians considered the talks so important
that the Political Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP)
was willing to give significant concessions: to cede a Danube sec-
tion, closing the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava and even giving
up Hungarian book publishing and book trade in Prague.6 Negotia-
4 The report of the Hungarian Embassy in Prague to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,
12th July 1953. Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereinafter referred to
only as MNL OL), Foreign Ministry documents (KÜL), TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-
1-j 21.box. 206/1953.
5 Ladislav Novomeský was already arrested 1951. He was released in 1956 and was
rehabilitated in 1963.
6 Minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee of the HWP of 18th November
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tions about a power station on the Danube and economic help started
between the two governments in November 1955. It turned up here
that the Hungarian government could give a part of the Danube to
Czechoslovakia in order to economise the construction works. Hun-
gary asked only for free transport and the right of fishing in return.
In early 1956, Hungary, in accordance with the talks that started
earlier, turned to Czechoslovakia for economic help. They asked for
10 million dollars in gold or cash for a two-year term. They also
asked Czechoslovakia to continue the export of 65 MWh electric en-
ergy, fixed in the aluminium treaty of 1951, for the year of 1956. The
Hungarians wanted the imported electrical energy from the German
Democratic Republic and Poland to be transported through Czecho-
slovakia.7 Hungary ordered T-34 tanks from the SkodaWorks but they
did not want them to be delivered due to the economic difficulties and
they asked for the cooperation of the Czechoslovak government.8 The
discussion of these questions took place in Prague on 3rd–4th February
1956 with the participation of Rákosi, Novotný and Prime Minister
Široký. During the talks, Novotný said that Czechoslovak economy
was working well, they had produced enormous growth in industrial
production during the previous years, they had remained within the
planned wage limits and productivity also increased. The Czechoslo-
vaks explained that they understood the difficult situation of Hungary
as other socialist countries had asked for their help as well. Široký re-
sented the Hungarians’ withdrawal from the purchase of the tanks;
he said that the tanks were being manufactured and to stop the pro-
duction would cause problems. Finally they agreed in the following
points: Czechoslovakia grants 10 million Swiss francs to Hungary for
two years at the interest of 2 %, and 5 million Swiss francs for one
year at the same interest. They also offered credit to Hungary for the
purchase of machines in order to facilitate Hungarian agricultural pro-
duction. They promised the Hungarians 55 MWh instead of 65 MWh
for 1956. The participants also agreed that the Ministers of Foreign
Trade of the two countries would meet in the near future in order to
1955. MNL–OL, MK-S f. 276, 53. cs., 257. o˝.e.
7 Minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee of the HWP of 1st February 1956.
Ibidem, 268. o˝.e.
8 Minutes of the meeting of the Political Commitee of the HWP of 6th February 1956.
Ibidem, 269. o˝.e.
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discuss the possibilities to take joint steps for appearance on the cap-
italist market. The Hungarian proposal for the power station on the
Danube was approved and the Hungarian book trade in Prague con-
tinued. Both parties pointed out that cooperation between the two
countries and their parties must be made even more intense.9
The Hungarian Question in Czechoslovakia in 1945–1955
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 found the Hungarian minority in
Czechoslovakia in a completely uncertain legal situation. After the
sufferings and disappointment during the SecondWorldWar and dur-
ing the years of being outlawed, the Hungarians were incapable of any
significant resistance against the totalitarian party system. They could
see the events of the Hungarian revolution from a specific point of
view due to the trauma of the population exchange. Let us take a little
detour to understand this situation clearly.
President Edvard Beneš proclaimed his government programme,
which emphasised the collective responsibility of the minorities, in
Košice on 5th April 1945. This deprived most Hungarians of any legal
protection and placed them into a homeless situation. The Czechoslo-
vak authorities began harassing the Hungarians and they also started
intense diplomatic activity to gain the support of the western pow-
ers for the evacuation of the Hungarian population. One of the most
important elements in the implementation of the Košice Programme
was the presidential decree No. 33 issued on 2nd August 1945, which
deprived the overwhelming majority of Hungarians of Czechoslovak
citizenship. This decree legalized the former discriminative arrange-
ments, which completely outlawed the Hungarians economically,
socially, politically and culturally. At the Potsdam Conference (July–
August 1945), the great powers did not give their consent to the relo-
cation of the Hungarian population. Despite this, discriminating mea-
sures were taken again and again. Beneš and his circle soon realised
that they could not convince the great powers about the necessity of
the evacuation of the Hungarians merely on the basis of the future se-
curity of Czechoslovakia and the plan of the creation of a nation state.
Therefore, they emphasised and exaggerated the fundamentally false
notion that the Hungarian and German national minorities were re-
9 Ibidem.
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sponsible for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1938–1939. They
labelled all Hungarians chauvinist and irredentist at the Paris peace
talks as well.10
The treaty of population exchange between Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, signed on 27th February 1946, did not settle problems be-
tween the two countries because it said that somanyHungarians could
be transported to Hungary as many Slovaks and Czechs signed up for
moving to Czechoslovakia. Beneš and the Czechoslovak leadership
continued their attacks against the Hungarian minority. They wanted
to eliminate the continuous Hungarian population along the border
by all means, and when they saw that they could not count on foreign
support, they started reslovakization. This assimilation campaign was
launched by the decree of the Slovak commissioner of foreign affairs
of 17th July 1946. The Hungarians were offered a choice: if they de-
clare themselves Slovak, they will get back their citizenship, otherwise
they will have to leave Czechoslovakia. As a result, over 400 thousand
Hungarians declared themselves Slovak. Also as a part of the assimi-
lation campaign, masses of Hungarians were deported to the Sudeten-
land referring to the compulsory public labour act. These people had
to go with their whole families; their homes were allocated to Slovak
Communist families from Northern territories.
The Allied Powers signed the peace treaty with Czechoslovakia and
Hungary in Paris on 10th February 1947. The Hungarian Government
resented that no assurance of the protection of human rights was guar-
anteed for Hungarian national minorities beyond the borders, pri-
marily in Czechoslovakia. On 12 April 1947, the evacuation of Hun-
garians from and the voluntary movement of Slovaks from Hungary
to Czechoslovakia set off. The Hungarian party leadership agreed
to continue the population exchange at the party summit (CCP and
HWP) in Budapest on 23rd–25th February 1948. They promised not to
initiate talks on theHungarianminority in Slovakia until the Czechoslo-
vakian elections in May. In return, the Czechoslovaks promised not
to worsen the case of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. This did
not change, however, the uncertain situation of the Hungarian mi-
nority. On 18th April 1948, Budapest protested against the deterio-
10 E. BENEŠ, Šest let exilu a druhé sveˇtové války: rˇecˇi, projevy a dokumenty z roku 1938–45,
Praha 1946, p 232.
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rating situation in a memorandum and they even mentioned stopping
the population exchange if the situation does not improve. Mátyás
Rákosi called the CCP leaders to account for failing to keep the points
of their former agreement. In 1948, after the Communist takeover
of Klement Gottwald and the troubles during the Beneš years, the
Communist Party promised that the Hungarian minority could re-
main in his native land and their citizenship would be restored in
the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. On
25th October 1948, the Czechoslovak National Assembly passed Act
245/1948, which enabled Hungarians to regain Czechoslovak citizen-
shipwith certain limitations on condition that they took an oath of loy-
alty within 90 days. Those who left Czechoslovakia duet to the pop-
ulation exchange agreement and those who committed crime against
the state, could not regain their citizenship.
The population exchange ended on 22nd December 194811 although
a few people arrived in Hungary as late as spring 1949. Approxi-
mately 100,000 Hungarians were expatriated officially, while the pop-
ulation of Czechoslovakia increased with 73,000 Slovaks from Hun-
gary. On 21st July 1949, a joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian committee
formally declared it completed. On 25th July 1949, the two statedmade
the agreement of Štrbské Pleso, which settled the economic and finan-
cial questions that arose in connection with the population exchange.
The Hungarian nationality question still remained a problem for
Czechoslovakia. After the Communist takeovers of 1948–1949 in East-
Central Europe, Moscow, bearing in mind the interests of the “Pax So-
vietica”, stopped the growing nationalist conflicts in the region with
the word of power. For the following forty years, the doctrine of
proletarian internationalism determined the policy of the Communist
party-state towards nationalism. Czechoslovakia was no exception
from this rule. The evolving Cold War atmosphere forged the coun-
tries of the Soviet Bloc together, and also the Czechoslovak-Hungarian
relations improved. The first sign of the approach was the signature
of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty of friendship, cooperation and
mutual assistance on 23rd June 1949. This helped to improve the sit-
uation of the Hungarian minority. In March 1949 the Cultural Asso-
11 For a summary of it see V. KATALIN, A kitelepítésto˝l a reszlovakizációig, Pozsony 2001;
A. POPÉLY, Fél évszázad kisebbségben, Somorja 2014, pp. 13–101.
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ciation of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia (Csemadok) was es-
tablished. Already in December 1948, the “Új Szó” (Hungarian Word)
a Hungarian Communist paper was given permission to appear. The
Hungarian minority gradually regained citizenship during 1949. A
five-member Hungarian Committee worked next to the Central Com-
mittee of the Slovakian Communist Party in 1949–1951. This commit-
tee controlled the execution of the party decisions in connection with
the Hungarian minority. The CCP and within it the SCP allowed Hun-
garians to join their ranks. The Hungarian institutions were presented
in the Czechoslovak press as the achievement of the Communist po-
litical system for which the Hungarians should be grateful. The se-
cret party decisions of the CCP between 1948 and 1952 on the eman-
cipation of the Hungarians, tried to eliminate of the consequences of
the outlawed situation, make the Hungarian settlements in South Slo-
vakia bilingual and gradually industrialise the agrarian regions. How-
ever, new ideas met with limitations and they remained mere plans.
In the first period of the existence of the Csemadok, 1949–1956, it func-
tioned as a little party in Czechoslovakia; no economic or political task
could be carried out without its support. It became one of the most in-
fluential organisations in the Hungarian villages. Its cultural charac-
teristic was only visible locally; at the national level, it functioned as a
political organisation. The Csemadok became target of Slovak nation-
alism. In 1953, it was criticised for playing “János vitéz”, a Hungarian
folk-tale-like play, too often. The red-white-green tricolor was waved
in it and one of the songs in the play said: “This flag is all that ours,
we shall never abandon it.”12 The Hungarians were crying aloud and
were applauding loudly at the end of the performances. The Slovak
authorities regarded this as the advance of Hungarian bourgeois na-
tionalism.
The new constitution of 1949 spoke about the nation of Czechs and
Slovaks only; it failed to mention other nationalities in the country.
The policy of the CCP regarding nationalities was not driven by the
wish to redress the injustices of the past. They wanted to use the
Hungarians, economically andmorally destroyedwith the Košice Pro-
gramme and the Beneš decrees, for the acceleration of the construc-
12 The report of the Hungarian High Consulate in Bratislava to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry on 6th August 1954. MNL OL, KÜM, TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 16/b
54. d. 6/5/1954.
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tion of Socialism. The arrangement whose objective was the com-
plete emancipation of the Hungarianminority in economy and culture
came into effect on 1st July 1952. It also declared the principle of bilin-
gualism. Complete equality before law did not come true, however.
The reslovakized, for example, were not regarded as Hungarian; the
authorities thought that they had to be educated in Slovak spirit. The
principle of bilingualism also failed to be accomplished as the relevant
party decision remained secret.
Hungarian-language primary and secondary schools were allowed
to work again in 1949–1950. Old Hungarian Communists with ex-
perience in public affairs were rehabilitated, and young cadres were
placed to leading positions. These steps improved the situation of the
Hungarian minority although their disadvantageous position and the
intrusion of the state in their lives did not come to an end. They were
not quite familiar with their legal possibilities; what laws they could
refer to. On 6th January 1950, the Presidency of the Central Committee
of the SCP accepted a resolution of several points, which contained
the plan of the real emancipation of the Hungarian minority. This
resolution ensured restitution for those who returned from the Czech
territory as well, it said that Hungarian members must be added to
national committees, official declarations must be published in two
languages and that the continuous supply of Hungarian teachers must
be organised. New schools opened and new papers were published;
on the other hand, some very important cultural institutions were
closed down. The Czechoslovak party leadership played an instru-
mental role in this. Among the liquidated institutions were the Hun-
garian Fold Ensemble in 1955 and the Hungarian book publishing
company in early 1956. These steps outraged the Hungarian intel-
lectuals. Since both the ensemble and the book publisher were closed
down due to financial reasons, several factories with Hungarian ma-
jority offered unpaid work to keep these institutions but their offer
was not approved of by the authorities.13
In the summer of 1956, a new constitutional law was made to calm
down the minorities. It said that cultural facilities must be provided
for Hungarian and Ukrainian nationalities. Cultural exchange became
13 The report of the Hungarian Embassy in Prague to the Hungarian Foreign Min-
istry on 3rd May. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 55. d. 215/1955.
005635/1955.
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invigorated between Czechoslovakia and Hungary; travelling was
made easier from one country to the other. Although visa requirement
was not abolished, crossing the border was now less complicated from
summer 1956. At the time of the outbreak of the revolution, 2,000–
5,000 Hungarian citizens were in Czechoslovakia and about just as
many Czechoslovak citizens in Hungary.14 The Hungarian Consulate
in Bratislava asked the Foreign Ministry to abolish the visa require-
ment as visas had no controlling, limiting or any other effect; they
merely show statistics about the travellers. In their view, such a step
would have a political message, and it could improve the relation-
ship between the two countries, since the majority of the travellers
were ethnic Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.15 The abolishment of
the visa requirement was eventually postponed due to the revolution
of 1956.
Czechoslovakia in 1956
Political ferment started in Czechoslovakia in the wake of the 20th
congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Khrushchev’s sever-hour
speech emphasised, among other ideas, the peaceful possibility of the
revolution. The event that elicited the loudest response was the crit-
icism of Stalin’s policy. The hope arose in the citizens of Czechoslo-
vakia: once self-cleaning has started within the party, perhaps they
will be able to live a more dignified life without oppression and terror.
After the Moscow congress, the Czechoslovak Communist Party be-
came invigorated: party members and outsiders now dared to speak
and criticise. Some even re-evaluated the role of Stalin, which would
have been impossible earlier. The Communist leadership received a
lot of criticism within the party; especially the violence of socialist
constitutionalism and the slow pace of rehabilitation were resented.
In March 1956, the Central Committee of the CCP decided to chan-
nel the debate on the cult of personality between strong limits, and
therefore the press was more seriously censored than before. They
wanted to consolidate the domestic social tensions with partial eco-
nomic reforms. Pay-rise was implemented in several state sectors,
14 The report of Consul General, József Bényi to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 18th
January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 4/j. 14. d.
15 The report of Consul General, József Bényi to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 27th
July 1956. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-32-a 8. d. 4/8/1956.
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weekly working hours were shortened, and the prices of a few con-
sumer goods were reduced. In 1956, there were students’ protests in
Czechoslovakia. Intellectuals occasionally asked inconvenient ques-
tions. Especially writers were thought to be dangerous but the politi-
cal leadership managed to silence them.
The Czechoslovak Communist Youth Organisation organised May
feasts in Prague and other cities for 20th May 1956, which were at first
banned but later allowed by the party leadership. In the days be-
fore the feast days student associations sent letters to factory workers.
They wrote that students in Czechoslovakia were fighting for liberty,
democracy and changes, and they ask theworkers for help. They gath-
ered their demands into 12 points, which focused on the liberalisa-
tion of university education; they demanded “more vacation, less Marx-
ism”.16 They organised a demonstration in the centre of Prague but
the State Security Service, on seeing banners against the government,
responded immediately. When the demonstrating youth would not
give in, police used violence. The two leaders of the student associa-
tion had already been arrested before 20th May. The others were cited
to the police station where they were told that unless they changed
their behaviour, they would have to bear the consequences. However,
Marxism was decreased from 40–50 to 30 lectures in the curriculum
and other measures were designed to alleviate the situation. They did
all they could in order to prevent students from arguing. As pun-
ishment and to prevent any disorder, students were no more sent to
significant political events.
The party group of the Czechoslovakian writers’ association de-
manded the abolishment of censorship in the summer of 1956. They
also accused the party leadership of weakness and not daring to re-
veal news of the debates in Poland and Hungary. Writers had been
criticising the regime in the press continuously since 1955, and there-
fore the leadership had an eye on them. Censorship had to prevent the
publication of any article with an anti-party tone. The Czechoslovak
public showed great interest in Hungarian papers in 1956. In order
to avoid the spread of any unwanted ideas, some Hungarian newspa-
pers were banned in Czechoslovakia. Irodalmi Újság (Literary Gazette)
16 The report of the Hungarian ambassador in Prague to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry, 31st May 1956. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 21. d.
116/2/1956.
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and Ludas Matyi (Matthias the Gooseboy – a satirical magazine) were
considered to be the most dangerous ones, so their official shipping
and selling was stopped.17 The Minister of the Interior had to person-
ally supervise the monitoring and permission of newspapers. In early
October 1956, news about the re-burial of László Rajk aroused keen in-
terest in Czechoslovakia. The Polish events andWładisławGomulka’s
speeches were roundly condemned by the Czechoslovak administra-
tion.18 At the meeting of Slovak party leaders of 18th October, with
the participation of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
CCP, Antonín Novotný, the First Secretary of the SCP, Karol Bacílek
pointed out that while official information from Prague failed to give
a clear picture of the events in Hungary, the Hungarian press was hav-
ing a great impact not only on the Hungarians but also on the non-
Hungarian speaking Slovak population. Novotný warned the Slovak
leaders that if they fail to take firm steps, a situation similar to that
in Poland and Hungary could develop in Slovakia as well. They also
decided to put the central newspaper of the Hungarian Communist
Party Szabad Nép (Free People) on the list of suspicious press items.
Czechoslovak censorship had to monitor Hungarian papers continu-
ously and prevent the circulation of suspicious ones.
Upon receiving news about the events of 23rd October in Budapest
the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party came
together immediately and they made several decisions. They declared
that a counter-revolutionwas going on in Hungary and the party lead-
ers and national committee leaders in districts are to be informed
about it (they were informed on 24th October). The first military ar-
rangements on 24th and 25th October remained in effect until the end
of 1956. The Czechoslovak army was put on alert. All Hungarian
newspapers were forbidden to bring to the country.19 According to the
minutes of the Political Committee meeting of 24th October 1956 the
Czechoslovak leadership did not accept an official viewpoint about
the policy of Imre Nagy. The leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist
17 D. CˇIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Die Ereignisse von 1956 und die slowakische Gesell-
schaft, in: H.H. HAHN – H. OLSCHOWSKY (eds.), Das Jahr 1956 in Ostmitteleuropa,
Berlin 1996, p. 84.
18 KAPLAN, p. 56.
19 J. MARUŠIAK, Slovakia and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in: A. ZUB – S. FLA-
VIUS (eds.), Sovietization in Romania and Czechoslovakia, Ias¸i – Bucharest 2003, p. 97.
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Party did not know at this point if Khrushchev or Molotov was to win
the struggle for power after the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist
Party in Moscow. The Hungarian events were far better understood in
Prague and Bratislava than in other Socialist countries; they immedi-
ately cancelled the visit of the government delegation to China, which
had been organised months before, knowing that making decisions
from the distance was difficult. On 24th October, Antonín Novotný at-
tended the emergency meeting of the Presidency of the Central Com-
mittee of the Soviet Communist Party, which focused on the events in
Poland and Hungary. There, “having been convinced about the gravity of
the situation”, he found the intervention of the Soviet military forces
in Budapest justified. He met with Nikita Khrushchev as well as other
Communist leaders from various countries, and he returned to Prague
on the same day. There he said that Khrushchev had harshly criticised
the Hungarian leaders for their passivity. He characterised the Hun-
garian events as counterrevolutionary takeover and he called the revo-
lutionaries “bandits”.20 The Czechoslovak party leadershipwas afraid
that if the movement was to extend to Slovakia, then the rebellious ter-
ritory which wanted to break away from the Soviet Union would form
one huge unit from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea.21 They introduced
a number of regulations in order to prevent this. Slovakia was closed
for tourism during the Hungarian revolution lest Western agents and
other unwanted figures could become active. On 24th October, suspi-
cious people were immediately arrested in Bratislava and other towns
along the border where unrest could be felt. It was enough to call the
Hungarian events “freedom fight” to get arrested. Slovak nationalism
became visible soon, too: Hungarian speakers were targets of harass-
ment in streets and offensive remarks at workplaces. A group of 35
researchers from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences reported that
the host Slovak factory told them to prepare for possible internship
in the near future.22 Rudolf Strechaj, the president of the Body of Slo-
20 J. BÍLEK – V. PILÁT, Bezprostrˇední reakce cˇeskoslovenských politických a vojen-
ských orgánu˚ na povstání v Mad’arsku, in: Soudobé deˇjiny, 4, 1996, p. 500.
21 K. KAPLAN, Csehszlovákia 1956-ban, in: C. BÉKÉS (ed.), Az 1956-os magyar for-
radalom helye a szovjet kommunista rendszer összeomlásában. Az 1991. július 13–15-én
Budapesten, az Országos Széchényi Könyvtárban megtartott nemzetközi konferencia jegyzo˝-
könyve, Budapest 1993, p. 91.
22 16th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-4/j, 14. d. 12/1957.
194
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
I. Janek, Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956
vakian Commissars, which functioned as an interim government, held
a meeting with the leaders of civil organisations on 25th October 1956.
The main question there was how to stop the spread of the Hungarian
revolution. Károly Pathó, the first secretary of Csemadok suggested
granting more rights to the nationalities and keeping the laws of 1952
which concerned the nationalities. This elicited great outrage;23 he
was called impertinent, and he was accused of turning the Hungarian
events to the advantage of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak Communist Party was united in the judgement of
the Hungarian revolution from the very beginning. Local authorities
in Slovakia were authorized to take steps in order to have an influence
on the public opinion beyond the borders and to give assistance to the
party leaders in the counties. The Czechoslovak leaders were afraid
that the political, national and social problems could lead to unrest
in the whole country but especially in Slovakia, and that such move-
ments could escalate into an uprising against the regime. This was not
completely unrealistic at the beginning. One of the diplomats at the
Hungarian consulate in Bratislava wrote these words: “The events that
took place in the first days were received well by the Slovaks. Later however
this gave way to a growing dislike [. . . ] due to the Slovak press, which wrote
about Hungarian territorial claims and irredentist voices.”24
Guards at public offices were strengthened and double police pa-
trols were given submachine guns. Magazines and party buildings
were guarded especially strongly. They also took care not to call atten-
tion. The most intense alert was ordered along the Hungarian border.
The question of the Hungarian minority was made even more prob-
lematic by the fact that the Slovak question itself was unsettled. Police
spies reported that the Czech population was afraid that the Slovaks
would use the international crisis to break away from Czechoslovakia.
Authorities were afraid of the movements of the Slovaks. “Party mem-
bers regularly checked churches, sports events and every place where people
gathered in great numbers.”25 The tension between Czechs and Slovaks
23 K. PATHÓ, Miért csökkent 1956-ban a Csemadok taglétszáma?, in: Vasárnap, May 5,
1995.
24 The report of József Bényi deputy consul from Prague to the Hungarian ForeignMin-
istry of 21st December 1956. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1 4/j, 14. d.
00277/1957.
25 The report of the Hungarian ambassador, József Gábor, to the Hungarian Foreign
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was manifested at the highest party level as well. In 1956, the exten-
sion of the rights of the central Slovakian institutions came into ques-
tion, but the idea of a federal system or autonomy were regarded as
nationalist and anti-state behaviour.
It was the sign of the distrust towards the Slovakian leadership that
the hard-line Stalinist Bruno Köhler was sent to Bratislava in order
to supervise the propaganda campaign against the Hungarian upris-
ing, and to keep an eye on the Slovak comrades. Slovaks felt that the
Czechs deceived them in 1945 again and they did not receive enough
authority to administer their own affairs. The rivalry between the
government officials in Prague and Bratislava deepened the tension
between the Czech and Slovak people. The Slovaks wanted more in-
dependence from Prague, but they were also anxious about the Hun-
garian minority in their smaller homeland. They did not want to share
Slovakia with them; it would have been interpreted as giving up some
of their national sovereignty. Their fears seemed justified when ru-
mour spread that the Hungarians wanted to regain Southern Slova-
kia.26 The party centre in Budapest also received news from its em-
bassy that “national Communism” appeared in Slovakia. The events
in Hungary temporarily stopped the activity against the Slovak intel-
lectual opposition. For the Czechoslovak leadership, the demonstra-
tion of unity was the most important task at that point. The propa-
ganda machinery set in motion as well: they propagated that what
was happening in Hungary was the work of the Hungarian reaction-
ary movement, and that the Hungarian lords wanted to put their
hands on Slovakia. They spoke about the Hungarian revolt as a na-
tionalist, chauvinistic movement, which was threatening the territo-
rial integrity of Czechoslovakia. They even plugged that the Hungar-
ians wanted to annex Slovakia and the country would function like
the Austro-Hungarian Empire.27 Many did not see the unreality of
this presumption, and therefore no wonder that the majority of the
Slovaks, after their initial sympathy, turned away from the Hungarian
revolution and looked forward to the victory of the Soviet troops. A
minority, mostly farmers, welcomed the Hungarian revolution; they
Ministry of 30th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia, XIX-J-1-j 4/j,
14. d. 00708/1957.
26 M. BLAIRE, Promarneˇná prˇíležitost. Cˇeskoslovensko a rok 1956, Praha 2001, p. 300.
27 Ibidem.
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were hoping that after the victory of the revolution, cooperative farms
would be dissolved and they would get back their land. The third
part of the Slovak population was hovering between supporting and
rejecting the Hungarian revolution. They were unable to decide what
would be favourable for them but after the Soviet occupation theywel-
comed the crushing of the revolution.
On 26th October 1956, the Czechoslovak leadership offered to the
leaders of the Soviet Communist Party to set up volunteer units and
despatch them in Hungary.28 Czechoslovak Prime Minister Široký
was planning a visit to Hungary as early as 26th October in order to
clarify the situation and give direct assistance, but the government of
Imre Nagy postponed the meeting to early November, hoping that or-
der would have been reinstated by then.
On 26th October 1956, the Political Committee of the Czechoslovak
Communist Party decided to put the army and the police on alert. On
28th October the armed units and the militia received order to be on
full alert (Lidové Milice – similar to the “Munkáso˝rség” or Workers’
Guard in Hungary after the revolution). In order to avoid unrest, the
Czechoslovak leadership made a decision to order newspaper editors
“to follow the correct line” regardingHungary and Poland.29 They did
not know what reaction to expect from the Hungarians in Slovakia.
Border guards were strengthened and the due discharge of soldiers
who completed their service was postponed for an uncertain date. The
fact that mostly Czech and Slovak reserves were called in for service
shows the utter distrust of the authorities towards the Hungarians.
The conscription of Poles was also avoided. Hungarian soldiers were
put to the Czecho-Moravian border area or they were sent home.30
The troops ordered to defend the Slovak-Hungarian border had oc-
cupied their positions only by 31st October. The strategic goal for the
army high-command was to defend the bridgehead at Bratislava in
case of a possible attack. Police received a special action plan by 28th
October: the celebration day of the 38th anniversary of the formation of
Czechoslovakia. The Communist opposition in Czechoslovakia was
inspired by the Polish and Hungarian events. On 27th October, the
28 BÍLEK – PILÁT, p. 501.
29 Said at the 146th meeting of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the
CCP on 26th October 1956. MNL OL, XXXII-16 Czechoslovakia 11. d.
30 MARUŠIAK, p. 100.
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authorities caught a groupwhichwas trying to start a protest by chant-
ing anti-government slogans in the crowd onWenceslas Square.31 The
first serious incident took place on that day: a group of eight occu-
pied a magazine near Jicˇín. Thanks to the quick action of the local
authorities, they were disarmed immediately. This elicited great fear
in the Communist leadership; they worked out a plan for the defence
of public buildings in Prague on the night of 27th–28th October. They
sent tanks to important junctions.32 At the meeting of the general staff
on 29th October it turned up that counter-revolutionary forces from
Hungary might want to cross the border and spread the uprising in
Slovakia. It seemed also possible that the Hungarian rebels would
be pushed to Czech territories. In order to prevent this, the general
staff decided to call reserves to service but they did not move troops
from the western part of the country as “this could be interpreted as if
they were mobilising against Hungary”.33 On the night of 31st October,
four students, aged 16–18, wrote this text on posters: “Students! [. . . ]
we do not want Socialism but democracy. We support the freedom fight of
the Hungarian people. With the United States of America forever! Death
on the Soviet Union! Away with Communists; we want freedom!”34 Later
they were sentenced for agitation against the regime. Political officers
started the preparation of the army as well. As a Slovakian-Hungarian
soldier who served there as a parachutist remembers that they were
instructed on 24th October: “The Hungarians in Hungary have revolted
against the Slavs, against Communism and the Soviet Union.”35 The local
political officer had him and his fellow soldiers sign a proclamation
in the military base at To˝keterebes on 25th October which said: “We
31 5th October 1956. Národní archiv, Praha (hereinafter NA), AÚV KSCˇ, fond 02/2-
Politické byro ÚV KSCˇ 120, a. j. 149.
32 J. MADRY, Reflexe mad’arského povstaní v jednáních ústrˇedních politických orgánu˚
Cˇeskoslovenska, in: Vojenská opatrˇení Cˇeskoslovenska v souvislosti s mad’arským povs-
taním 1956: Veˇdecké kolokvium s mezinárodní úcˇastí, konané ve dnech 22.–23. zárˇí 1993
v Historickem ústavu Armády Cˇeské republiky v Praze, Praha 1994, p. 30.
33 Note from the special meeting of the College of the National Defence Ministry on
29th October 1956. Vojenský historický archiv, Praha (hereinafter VHA), fond MNO,
1956 SM/KM, 1/10–2.
34 28th December 1956. NA Praha, AÚV KSCˇ, fond 02/2-Politické byro ÚV KSCˇ 162, a.
j. 126.
35 Z. BALASSA, Csehszlovákiai emléktöredékek 1956-ból, in: Erdélyi Magyarság, 1996,
Oktober 28, p. 26.
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demand to be dispatched as volunteers against the Hungarians. We promise
to keep our vow and exterminate the Hungarians in the name of the Slavs!”36
(The parachutist denied the signature of this, and therefore he was
dismissed two weeks later.)
The armed forces and the party apparatus were on alert so that
if the waves of the Hungarian events should splash into Czechoslo-
vakia, they could choke them immediately. On the encouragement
of the party organisations, 7,000 protesting telegram arrived at the
CCP and the government; they condemned the Hungarian counter-
revolution but they expressed their sympathy towards the Hungarian
people. The CCP wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the HWP
on 29th October, in which they assured the Hungarian party admin-
istration of their sympathy and astonishment. “All this deeply touches
our people, who can see a friendly fraternal country in the People’s Repub-
lic of Hungary, which is linked to us with the common ideas of Socialism
and peace.”37 The Czechoslovak administration expressed its hope that
the clashes would end and the construction of Socialism could con-
tinue in Hungary. The Czechoslovak government assured the Hun-
garian people of it support in economic development and raising the
living standard. They sent their wish to the Hungarian working class
through the government: “Our path is lighted with the great teaching
of Marxism-Leninism. Being filled with the deep emotions of proletarian
internationalism we wish he Hungarian Workers’ Party to lead the Hun-
garian people to prosperity, to the flourishing of the country, to the victory
of Socialism.”38 The Hungarian ambassador to Prague had talks with
Prime Minister Široký on 2nd November. The latter already doubted
the loyalty of Imre Nagy to the party and his dedication to the con-
struction of Socialism in the future.39 On the same day, Novotný and
Široký participated at the Bucharest meeting, where Khrushchev and
Malenkov informed the Romanian and Czechoslovak administration
about the Soviet military intervention. The Czechoslovak leaders of-
fered joint military offensive for the second time, only to be rejected
36 Ibidem.
37 Sent by the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the HWP on
29th October 1956. MNL OL, Czechoslovakia XXXII-16 11 d.
38 Ibidem.
39 30th January 1957. MNLOL, KÜMTÜKCzechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 4/j, 14. d. 33/1957.
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again.40 Novotný informed the Political Committee about the content
of themeeting, the second invasion of Hungary, on the same day. They
decided that President Zápotocký would send a radio message to the
public about this event on 3rd November. The Czechoslovak Army did
not participate in the intervention but there are sources which say that
some units were deployed under Soviet flag around Komárom.41 The
events in Hungary gave an opportunity for the Czechoslovak admin-
istration to consolidate its position in the country. Fort those, crushing
the Hungarian revolution gave justification for their own former pol-
icy, and they thought they were correct in the evaluation of the objec-
tives decided on the 20th congress. On 20th November 1956, the For-
eign Minister abolished those military regulations that were in effect
in Czechoslovakia since 24th October.42 The Hungarian population in
Slovakia was surprised by the news of the revolution.43 As an eyewit-
ness put it: “[M]orally collapsed, lacerated in spirit, waiting for a Liberator
Moses, the news of the Hungarian revolution struck the distressed Hungari-
ans like lightning from a clear sky.”44 After the first successes, they began
to hope that the revolutionary ideas would spread in Czechoslovakia
as well. They expected the democratisation of the regime, and there-
fore they regarded the Hungarian revolution as their own case. “Well,
at least the Hungarians teach the Russians once [. . . ] Imre Nagy was spoken
about like Peto˝fi and Kossuth; people put their trust in him. [. . . ] People
were enthusiastic in secret, women were praying in secret for the success of
the revolution – a memoir says – every Hungarian honestly believed that if
the Bolshevist gendarmes leave, the Czechoslovak political life would return
to a more humane democracy, similar, at least, to that of the republic between
the two world wars.”45 Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were so strongly
intimidated that they did not think of any mass movements during
40 KAPLAN, p. 56.
41 BALASSA, p. 26. The deployment of the Czechoslovak Army has not been proved
with archive documents.
42 J. PERNES, Ohlas mad’arské revoluce roku 1956 v cˇeskoslovenské verˇejnosti, in:
Soudobé deˇjiny, 4, 1996, p. 525.
43 A. SIMON, A szlovákiai magyarok és az 1956-os forradalom, in: E. IVANICˇKOVÁ –
A. SIMON (eds.), Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom és Szlovákia, Somorja – Pozsony 2006,
pp. 41–42.
44 M. KMECZKÓ, Hogyan élték meg 1956-ot a csehszlovákiai magyarok? Visszaemlé-
kezések színes csokra, in: Dimenziók, 1, 1994, p. 11.
45 Ibidem.
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the days of the revolution. They could express their support only fig-
uratively and only in secret. Some tried to get to Hungary illegally in
order to give help to the rebels. On 30th October 1956, twenty-seven
people tried to cross the borders at Csákányháza, near Lucˇenec. Seven
of them were shot dead or captured.46 In Dunaszerdahely, the author-
ities prevented the strike of the local Hungarians.47 On 24th October,
the meeting of the Central Committee decided to send agents to stu-
dents’ gatherings in order to prevent the “ideological dissent” from
spreading any further. Students of the Faculty of Mining in Košice re-
membered their dead fellows in Hungary with a one-minute silence
in spite of the strict spying activity. Students of the local Hungarian
secondary school in Lucˇenec wore a black ribbon. The administration
ordered district and sub-district party organisations to cooperate with
the security forces and prevent any counter-revolutionary action. Cse-
madok was put under supervision and its leaders were given instruc-
tions how to think about the Hungarian events. The Central Com-
mitee of the Csemadok held a meeting on 26th October 1956. They
were cautious enough not to take minutes of the meeting lest it could
be used against them later. They condemned the Hungarian uprising
on 29th October, and they called members to participate at the events
of the Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship month.48 Members considered
the Csemadok declaration an open betrayal and about 9–10 %, about
2,000 people left the organisation immediately. At the meeting of the
Slovak National Front on 24th July 1957, the president of Csemadok,
Gyula Lo˝rincz said: “1957 is not 1938 [. . . ] the absolute majority of the
Hungarian workers in Czechoslovakia stood firm in the critical October days,
and they proved that they loved their country the Republic of Czechoslovakia,
that they are good patriots. However, it would be a mistake not to see the
other side of the coin: that there are outcasts, who were hiding so far, who
have gained courage during the Hungarian revolution and attempted to cre-
ate trouble, in vain, among the Hungarian workers in Czechoslovakia.”49
The text served as justification: there was no reason for the collec-
tive punishment of the Hungarians as it had happened in 1945. The
46 A. SZESZTAY, Nemzetiségi kérdés a Kárpát-medencében 1956–62, Budapest 2003, p. 39.
47 T. HAJDU, A magyar reakció népellenes puccsa. A Csehszlovák KB 1956. december
5-6-i ülése amagyarországi eseményekro˝l, in: Évkönyv II. 1993, Budapest 1993, p. 130.
48 Új Szó, 30th October 1956, p. 4.
49 Hét, 7th July 1957.
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publication of the news in the national newspapers showed that the
Hungarians in Slovakia could not be identified with the revolution.
Articles and comments in the Czechoslovak press about the Hungari-
ans truly showed the attempts of the government for the consolidation
of its domestic and foreign policy. The Czechoslovak Government and
the party leaders agreed with the Soviet military invasion in Hungary
and they gave all they could to support it. Measures of the Nagy gov-
ernment were highlighted or not mentioned – in accordance with the
momentary interest. On 24th October, the Hungarian events were not
yet mentioned because First Secretary Novotný had earlier warned
the press to be cautious and ordered it to avoid the evaluation of the
events in Budapest andWarsaw.50 On the other hand, Rudé právo pub-
lished an editorial to draw the attention of all the workers in the coun-
try to the importance of unity; it spoke about the indissoluble unity of
Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and emphasised: “We have to bear in
mind our own situation, our own questions and problems rather than those
of others.” In the first days of fighting, they called the events “acts of
white terror” and they supported their arguments with articles from
Soviet newspapers. The editorial of Rudé právo on 25th October called
the reader for further caution and they labelled the Hungarian events
counter-revolution. 25th October marked a clear change in terminol-
ogy: they called the Hungarian rebels inhumane beastly enemies, who
had been preparing in secret and now took the opportunity and at-
tacked the Hungarian people.51 On the other hand, articles expressed
solidarity with the “Hungarian working people” from the beginning.
Új Szó, the only Hungarian-language newspaper in Czechoslovakia
at that time, first reported the Budapest events of 23rd October on 25th
October. Typical of party propaganda, the article published the party
opinion before reporting the events themselves. They tried to convey
the message that everything was in order in Czechoslovakia and there
was no reason for movements similar to those in Hungary. What ac-
tually happened in Budapest appeared in the foreign policy section
of the paper, under the title “Serious events in Hungary”, which fur-
ther decreased its significance. In their opinion, counter-revolutionary
groups were successfully eliminated. They tried to convince readers
50 HAJDU, p. 125.
51 Rudé právo, 25th October 1956.
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that all resistance had stopped. On 26th October, they published an-
other article with the title “With determination and certainty”, which
emphasised the necessity of loyalty to and friendship with the Soviet
Union. Új Ifjúság (New Youth), the weekly of the Central Committee
of the Socialist Youth Association in Slovakia, published two articles
with rebellious tone that had got through censorship on 27th October.
They called for solidarity with Hungary on the last page, in the sport
section, thoroughly paraphrased, and they recommended following
programmes in the Hungarian radio and on Austrian television. The
other article demanded Slovakian Hungarian writers to write the slan-
der of the Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia after WWII. Sev-
eral journalists were dismissed later due to these articles. On 27th Oc-
tober, Új Szó published articles underlining the unity of Slovak and
Hungarian workers and their loyalty to the party. The paper adopted
the viewpoint of the party group of the writers’ association: the prin-
ciples of proletarian internationalism must determine the relationship
with Poland and Hungary. From 28th October, all caution in the tone
was dropped: what happened in Hungary was not a local rebellion
and determined steps were required.
For a few days from 28th October 1956, Új Szó was published in
two editions: one for the Czechoslovakian Hungarians, the other one
for Hungary. Besides, pamphlets were sent to Hungary, especially in
Komárom and Nógrád counties, on behalf of Hungarian revolution-
ary organisations.52 Special editions of Új Szó appeared in several
thousand copies (occasionally it exceeded the number of 10,000) un-
til as late as 30th November. The paper usually had two pages. Spe-
cial four-page editions were also published on 7th and 25th Novem-
ber. Articles on Hungary had been discussed with the ideology de-
partment of the party before publication: the voice of the Hungarian
population in Slovakia did not appear in them; they served merely
as a mouthpiece for the views and slogans of the Czechoslovak party
leadership. Besides Új Szó, another paper, Új Ifjúság (New Youth) also
issued a few special editions for publication in Hungary. Also, a few
issues of Északmagyarország (NorthernHungary), a newspaper inHun-
gary, were printed in Košice due to the strike of printers in Hungary.
52 16th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1 4/j, 14. d. 12/1957.
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Shipping and selling of this paper was organised by Károly Grósz,
later Prime Minister of Hungary.53
The Czechoslovak press started to analyse the causes of theHungar-
ian revolution from 29th October. They pointed out serious economic
mistakes as well as the division and uncertainty of the leadership.
They warned workers to be cautious and said that “the power of the
working class cannot be risked”. They called their own workers to keep
unity and be perseverant, and theymentioned the incident onWences-
las Square with praise: when provocation among the crowd was im-
mediately choked and no trouble was made on 24th October.54 On
29th October,Új Szó prophesied the victory of order for Hungary: “The
Hungarian people, led by the party, has victory over the counter-revolutiona-
ry gangs.” On 30th October, they began a campaign against Miklós
Horthywith the title “Horthy rule never again”. They published an ar-
ticle on the same page which started with this sentence: “We keep prole-
tarian internationalism watchfully as the apple of our eye.” The Czechoslo-
vak party leaders found it necessary that the Slovakian Hungarians
also issue a declaration of loyalty. The faculty and students of the
Hungarian Pedagogic School in Bratislava had to declare that: “We as-
sure the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and
the government of the republic that we stay firm by the Central Commit-
tee and the government. Under no circumstances shall we allow counter-
revolutionary forces to disturb order in our country the Republic of Czecho-
slovakia. We want to retain close friendship with the Soviet Union and the
states with people’s democracy.”55 31st October was another landmark in
the evaluation of theHungarian events. Newspapers reported the pro-
clamation of Imre Nagy that leaders of the 1945 coalition parties ap-
peared in the new close cabinet. The Czechoslovak press commented
this as green light towards a reactionary takeover.
On 1st November, Rudé právo reported the events with the title
“Tragic days in Hungary” based on the reports of witnesses, journal-
ists of Reuters and other agencies. The article outlined economic dif-
ficulties in Hungary, the great number of dead civilians, it reported
the appearance of József Mindszenty and terrorist atrocities against
53 KMECZKÓ, pp. 13–14.
54 30th January 1957. MNLOL, KÜMTÜKCzechoslovakia XIX-J-1-j 4/j, 14. d. 33/1957.
55 Új Szó, 30th October 1956.
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communists. From 1st November, witness reports appeared in Új Szó
as well, about Budapest, certain regions of the country, the Czecho-
slovak–Hungarian border, and they often showed photos from West-
ern newspapers about murdered Communists and ÁVH (State Protec-
tion Authority – the Hungarian Party Militia) members. It its issue of
2nd November, Rudé právowrote that the position of Imre Nagy was in
danger as counter-revolutionaries wanted to replace him with some-
onewho could truly represent landholders and factory owners as well.
The newspaper criticised the leniency of Imre Nagy towards counter-
revolution. On 2nd November, Új Szó published the front-page article
“The peoples of Hungary must decide”, in which they showed what
cruelty Hungarian workers and peasants had to face during the white
terror of Horthy. The article were completed with two pictures: one
showed amodern scene in Budapest built byworkers after thewar, the
other one recalled the 1940s: a family was evicted for not having paid
the rent. This latter could be interpreted as a covert threat on the Slo-
vakian Hungarians as it certainly could wake memories of a relocated
Slovakian family. The possible message was: the Hungarians should
bear in mind what future they could expect if they supported the rev-
olution. On 3rd November, President Antonín Zápotocký gave a radio
speech to the citizens of Czechoslovakia, which could also be read in
Rudé právo on 4th November. The President explained that interven-
tion in Hungary was inevitable. “Hungarian reaction, hand in hand with
Western imperialists, started to implement its long-organised plan, which is
not only against the people’s power but, in effect, against all Socialist coun-
tries and world peace.” Zápotocký acknowledged that numerous mis-
takes had been made in Hungary and he found it understandable that
the Hungarian people tried to perfect the Socialist state and make for-
mer mistakes good. However, he continued, an irresponsible debate
began in Hungary, which shook the construction of Socialism and,
having generated faction debates, broke the unity of the Hungarian
Workers’ Party and disabled its work. He put the blame on Imre Nagy
for Hungary’s leaving the alliance of the Socialist countries.
Zápotocký also mentioned the position of Czechoslovakia, where,
in spite of the attacks of the Capitalist press, there is tranquillity, polit-
ical and economic stability. The reaction tried to attack economic sta-
bility in order to bring the country to the same fate as Hungary. West-
ern states had sent several spy gangs to Czechoslovakia to achieve
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this, but all had been caught. The President pointed out that Social-
ist democracy would be placed on wider fundaments, which would
ensure the constant rise of material and cultural demands as well as
the participation of an everwidening layer of industrial workers, peas-
ants and intellectuals in administration. “[W]e are not insane to give
democratic rights to our enemies to jeopardize tranquillity and disturb the
construction of Socialism in our country,” he remarked with a threaten-
ing tone. “The words of Comrade Gottwald still apply to us today: we will
not allow the destruction of the republic!” About the connection between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, he said: “Our people is express-
ing its firm trust towards the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in these
very days; the party drew correct conclusions from the 20th congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union at its national conference. The party
turns the effort of millions of workers to the further prosperity of the coun-
try.” He closed his speech with these words: “Let us continue on the
road of struggle for peace and friendship among nations! Together with the
Soviet Union forever!” The quoted Zápotocký speech also proves that
the sample was given for the ultimate evaluation of events.
The 3rd November issue of Új Szó said that Hungary was under the
threat of attack from clerical, reactionary andHorthy supporters. “The
masses of the Hungarian people undoubtedly have a historic duty: to
prevent the victory of reaction.” On the same page, another title said:
“The situation requires the people to turn against Horthy-Fascist ele-
ments firmly.” Horthy’s name sounded so bad in Czechoslovakia that
Slovaks were ready to do anything against it. The article said that pro-
Horthy officers and other Fascist agents were released from prison,
and the staff of Horthy officers was formed in the Buda hills and they
organised the bloodshed. “All this shows,” the article explained “that
a vicious, well-prepared and organised group trapped the working people of
Hungary, which soon found itself under the attack of the forces of intervention
[sic!] of foreign reaction. The people of Czechoslovakia assures the Hungarian
workers of its warm, fraternal solidarity in this fight.”56
On the afternoon of 4th November and the morning of 5th Novem-
ber, all Czechoslovak daily papers published a special issue. They
received the news of the fall of the “counter-revolution” with general
release, and celebrated the victory of Soviet troops. They pointed out
56 Új Szó, 3rd November 1956.
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that the government of Imre Nagy fell apart and the Premier was a
traitor. They recognised the Kádár Government from the first moment
and assured it of their support. From 6th November 1956, Rudé právo,
and later other papers as well, reported that Czechoslovak industrial
and agricultural workers offered financial help to the workers of Hun-
gary. Great quantities of food supply was sent to Hungary. Offers
were continually mentioned in the press; photographs were taken of
packing and shipping.57 The 7th November issue of Rudé právo wrote
that “they had not trusted the neutrality of the traitor Imre Nagy”, and
they did not believe in the “neutrality of the Horthy oppressors and Hun-
garian Fascists”.58 By referring to such ideas they tried to point out
that Hungarian revisionism could demand the Hungarian-populated
part of Slovakia again. The issues of the paper between 3rd and 7th
November gradually turned towards the Suez Crisis and the situation
in Hungary so this topic slowly disappeared from the press.
Signs of Sympathy during the Revolution
ManyCzechs and Slovaks expressed their agreement with and sympa-
thy towards the Hungarian events with acts. On 7th November 1956,
a banner was hanged in a busy street of Ostrava with these words:
“Katyn´ – Warsaw – Hungary, the work of Soviet murderers.”59 Anti-gov-
ernment and anti-Soviet leaflets were found in Prague and other cities.
In Plzenˇ, copies of one of Gomułka’s speeches with Free Europe head-
ing were thrown into mailboxes on 12th November. Another leaflet
demanded free elections and the re-trial of the Slánský case. In
Nitra, police caught five students because they were distributing anti-
Communist and anti-Soviet newspapers and leaflets. In late 1956, a
group of seven university students was sentenced in Pardubice be-
cause they wanted to organise demonstrations against the regime dur-
ing the Hungarian revolution. Czechoslovak police reports spoke
about the consolidation of the situation and that no serious move-
ments could be expected after the crushing of the Hungarian revolu-
tion. A report of 10th November in Brno said that the Hungarian rev-
olution was not condemned in the censored letters,60 which let them
57 20th February 1957. MNLOL, KÜMTÜKCzechoslovakia. XIX-J-1-k 23. d. 13/a/1957.
58 Rudé právo, 7th November 1956.
59 PERNES, p. 522.
60 Ibidem, p. 524.
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think that many welcomed the Hungarian events there. In Bratislava,
posters called people for the support of the Hungarian freedom
fight; it become customary to greet each other with “Cˇépé” (we are
waiting for a turn).61 At one of the railway stations of the city this text
could be read: “We want freedom and independence, death on Commu-
nism!” Leaders mostly feared that the celebrations on the anniversary
of the October Socialist revolution could be disturbed with troubles,
and therefore preventive measures were taken all over the country.
Suspicious people, familiar from former police lists, who they thought
could cause problems, were gathered before the November proces-
sion. Six university students were arrested in Prague, who confessed
that they hadwanted to get arms from policemen onWenceslas Square
and began a revolt. In Plzenˇ, four medical students were caught, who
had accumulated arms and medicine and spread news from Radio
Free Europe.
On 4th November, in the vicinity of Tiszaágcsernyo˝, the upper ca-
ble of the railway that led towards the Soviet border was damaged by
a mine, which was placed there by rebels from Hungary or their lo-
cal supporters. Therefore, Soviet troops arriving from Csap (Cˇop) via
Czechoslovakia had to march to Hungary on foot.62 On 7th Novem-
ber, about 25,000 people came together for the celebration in Prague;
they received the news about putting down the Hungarian “counter-
revolution” with acclamation. In late October and early November,
due to the events in Hungary and the Suez Crisis, rumour spread in
the country: the third world war was at hand, mobilization could soon
be expected, food rationing would be introduced and Czech crown
would be replaced by rubel. People began purchasing everything in
large quantities: long-term utensils, especially food, sugar, flour, lard
and soap. They were bought in twenty-, fifty- and one hundred-kilo-
gram packs. There were long lines in front of shops. In a Czech village,
police had to take action and separate womenwhen panic broke out as
people were afraid that there was not enough food for all. In Prague,
people also began buying gold and silver. Authorities tried to stop
the “reactionary propaganda” that a shortage of goods would come
soon. President Zápotocký said in the radio that it was false informa-
61 Ibidem, p. 520.
62 L. BALOGH, 1956 Kárpátalján, in: Napi Magyarország, October 27, 1998.
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tion spread by the enemy with the purpose of creating disorder. He
explained that they would not have run out of food supply even if the
population had spent all the money in circulation at once. The author-
ities ordered that goods had to be carried to shops on military lorries,
and they could prevent shortage. The shopping fever decreased only
after 10th November.
Also Czechoslovak party and government leaders drew conclusions
from the Hungarian events. They brought forward the decrease of
prices which was originally planned for 3rd December. Although the
system of compulsory delivery was not abolished its conditions were
lightened.
Czechoslovakian Assistance for Hungary
How did the Czechoslovak administration respond to the crushing of
the Hungarian revolution? A report on Soviet victory was issued as
early as 4th November. The CC of the CCP ordered Bratislava and
the district party leaders to hold short meetings before the start of
work on the following day. At these meetings, following the instruc-
tions of the party agents, workers made various offerings for the as-
sistance of the Hungarians. Former political help was followed by
economic help. The Political Committee of the CC of the CCP decided
to establish a Solidarity Fund for the workers of the People’s Repub-
lic of Hungary on 5th November 1956. The incomes were distributed
through the Czechoslovakian Red Cross. The Czechoslovakian Youth
Association, the Women’s Movement and the National Committees
helped to collect the donations. However, only 60 million crowns
were collected instead of the planned 300 million. A government sub-
sidy of 90 million crowns was added to this (calculated at retail price),
which meant mostly electric power and shipping of goods.63 After
5th November, Czechoslovak citizens were able to post parcels for pri-
vate addresses. On 8th November, the CC of the CCP concluded that
the population responded to the call of the leaders and assured the
party of their support in thousands of letters. The Political Commit-
tee, at its 154th meeting of 12th November, accepted a letter addressed
63 20th February 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-k 23. d 13/a/1957.
A. POPÉLY, A Szlovák pártvezetés és az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom, in: E.
IVANICˇKOVÁ –A. SIMON (eds.),Az 1956-osMagyar Forradalom és Szlovákia, Somorja
– Pozsony 2006, p. 62.
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to János Kádár, in which they informed the Hungarian leader about
the planned Czechoslovak help to Hungary (5,000 tons of flour, 5,000
tons of potato, 100 tons of meat, 5,000 tons of cement, 10,000 tons
of lime, 325,000 square meters of roof cover material, 100,000 square
meters of sheet-glass, 2,000 cubic metres of log, 3,000 cubic metres
of plank and 3,600 tons of firewood; many medicine, textile articles,
shoes, china, food and other consumer goods in the value of 32,4 mil-
lion crowns).64 The first government delegation to Budapest was led
by the Prime Minister on 16th November 1956.65 He went home with
a contract of assistance of goods and promised help of any kind to the
Kádár Government.66 Later, the Czechoslovak Red Cross also gave
help to dissidents returning from the West, who were able to travel
through Czechoslovakia free of charge from January 1957. The Hun-
garian Foreign Ministry and the Czechoslovak Red Cross encouraged
in their correspondence to distribute the donations according to the
agreement between the two countries; they wanted thereby to prevent
the Budapest mission of the International Red Cross from getting in-
volved in the distribution.67 They were afraid that the origin of trans-
port of weapons for the Hungarian Communists would be revealed.
The party centre in Slovakia organised a propaganda squad from
more than fifty Hungarian-speaking Slovakians, who organised meet-
ing nearly every day in the settlements in the border area. Here the
local people were supposed to declare their agreement with the party
decisions. Slovakian local authorities were given certain autonomy in
supporting and influencing the party leaders in the mostly Hungar-
ian counties along the border.68 As part of the assistance programme,
weapons, clothes and food supply were transported, not only to set-
tlements along the border, but also to Miskolc and Budapest. Lorry
drivers and their escort were appointed from among Hungarian-spea-
king agents of national committees of territorial party committees but
there were Hungarian-speaking volunteers as well. It was their task,
64 12th November 1956. MNL OL, XXXII-16 Czechoslovakia 11. d.
65 Népszabadság, 17th November 1956.
66 POPÉLY, Fél évszázad, p. 216.
67 24th January 1957. MNL OL, KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-1-k 23.d 13/a
000156/1957.
68 The report of the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava on 3rd July 1957. MNLOL, KÜM
TÜK, Czechoslovakia, XIX-J-32-a, 9. d. 47/1/1957.
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beyond the transport, to get information and the “organisation” of the
comrades in Hungary.
During the revolution, most Hungarian Communists and ÁVH
members fled to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was the sec-
ond most popular destination. They were warmly welcomed and pro-
vided with accommodation and catering69 but they were also under
observation. One attendant at the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava
heard that the Czechoslovak leaders were not pleased with every
Hungarian comrade who arrived from Hungary in October 1956. A
lot of Hungarian comrades did not want to return at all due to the
developments. “There were only a few who came, discussed problems and
returned to fight.”70 In Slovakia, students as well as the headmasters
of the Hungarian schools in Komarno and Bratislava were called to
account for various acts of solidarity. In one class, Nemzeti dal (Na-
tional Song – a patriotic poem by Sándor Peto˝fi, one of the symbols
of the 1848 revolution and national independence) was recited on 15th
March 1957, after which police went to the school and interrogations
were held for days. The headmaster was labelled nationalist and dis-
missed. For years, state and party authorities considered it a proof
of reliability what viewpoint one adopted during these days. Until
early November 1956, 220 Hungarians were taken to one of the pris-
ons in Bratislava.71 This number probably includes those Hungarian
citizens who wanted to cross the border to Austria near Rajka and got
to Czechoslovak territory by mistake. The other captives were possi-
bly Slovakian Hungarians who agitated in support of the revolution
in October 1956 or tried to cross the border and fight as a freedom
fighter in Hungary. One of the assistants at the Hungarian Consulate
in Bratislava paid a visit of introduction to the president of the Body
of Commissioners, Rudolf Strechaj, on 29th July 1957, when his host
told him that the counter-revolution had had no significant disruptive
effect in Slovakia, and this, he emphasised, applies to the Slovakian
Hungarians as well. To his best knowledge, 43 ethnic Hungarians
were arrested during the counter-revolution, most of whom had for-
69 G. DUBA, Örvénylo˝ ido˝, Pozsony 1982, p. 344.
70 Report of the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava. 2nd June 1957. MNL OL, KÜM
TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-J-32-a, 9. d. 47/3/1957.
71 SZESZTAY, p. 39.
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merly been landowners or officers in the Horthy army.72 There were
5,757 Hungarian citizens in Czechoslovakia on 23rd October 1956. Af-
ter 28th November 1956, 5,010 returned to Hungary, 392 remained in
Czechoslovakia and 353 left for other countries. Between 23rd October
and 28th November 1956, 1367 people crossed the border illegally.73
Until December 1956, 665,74 according to another source 674,75 peo-
ple were prosecuted. To determine the exact number requires further
research.
Summary
In 1956, the authorities in Czechoslovakia successfully prevented any
possible revolt. It can be stated that peace was not seriously disturbed
in both the Czech and the Slovak territories, and no significant move-
ment took place. A Czech journalist summarised the behaviour of the
people with these words: “In Communist Poland, people were collecting
medicine and blood-plasma to send them to the Hungarian rebels, while the
Czechs were playing the lottery and the people in Bratislava went to a hockey
match.”76
Czechoslovakia pulled through the critical year of 1956 and she got
stronger. A movement similar to the Hungarian revolution did not oc-
cur in the country because the economic situation was far better and
the standard of living was considerably higher here. As a consequence
of stability, the events in Poland and Hungary did not elicit serious
clashes in Czechoslovakia. The other important reason was the quick,
determined and united action of the leadership; a weaker government
could not have handled the situation so successfully. The hurry was
justified; they had every reason to fear that if Hungary succeeded in
leaving the Socialist bloc, the Hungarian minority would be a constant
source of unrest in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it was their primary in-
terest to see the revolution crushed and order restored as soon as pos-
72 The report of the Hungarian Consulate in Bratislava on 29th July 1957. MNL OL,
KÜM TÜK Czechoslovakia XIX-j-32-a, 9 d. 47/5/1957.
73 MARUŠIAK, p. 102.
74 HAJDU, p. 130.
75 P. GERMUSKA, Najnovšie poznatky o mad’arskej revolúcii roku 1956 a mad’arsko-
slovenské vzt’ahy roku 1956, in: M. ŠTEFANSKÝ – M. ZÁGORŠEKOVÁ (eds.), Krizy
režimov sovietskeho bloku v rokoch 1948–1989, Banská Bystrica 1997, p. 161.
76 PERNES, p. 524.
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sible. The speech of the Chief Editor of Rudé právo, V. Koucký given
at the district conference of the CCP, in Karlovy Vary in March 1957,
proves this: “[I]f the Soviet Army had been unable to give assistance for
any reason, we would have helped the Hungarian working class in a similar
manner.”77 Koucký was the leader of the CC delegation of the CCP at
the conference. The Political Committee of the CCP responded to the
Hungarian events extremely quickly; they came together and made
decisions on the following day. Czechoslovak society was not pre-
pared for a political change in the 1950s; this happened only in the
late 1960s. In Czechoslovakia, the writers’ association and later the
Youth Association and the intellectuals generated most of the prob-
lems. The state administration managed, with preventive measures,
to get the youth to keep away from any “reactionary” act. Although
the question of legality of the János Kádár government was brought
up at discussions as well as the justifiability of the Soviet invasion,
but expressing opposition to these ideas brought about reprisals. The
Hungarian population in Slovakia could choose betweenminority sta-
tus and survival or revolt. Sober consideration excluded open support
of the Hungarian revolution. Memories of the reprisals after 1945were
still quite vivid among the Hungarians, and the charge of irredentism
was also dangerous. Therefore, any kind of resistance or rebellion was
meaningless. The Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia had to pay
the price for guilt at any turning points of Czechoslovak and Hungar-
ian history: in 1918, 1938, 1945 and 1948. In 1956, they had a choice.
The Hungarians did not have any significant movements except for a
few isolated cases. They chose passive resistance. Still, it could be seen
that the idea of Hungarian liberty could have been a motivating force
under more favourable circumstances. After the 1956 events, those
who openly supported the revolution were punished in Czechoslo-
vakia as well, but the whole national minority could not be punished
collectively. It was not in the interest of Czechoslovakia any more,
nor could it harmonize with the policy of the Soviet Union as a great
power.
77 The speech of V. Koucký at the conference of the CC of the CCP on 16th–17th March
1957. NA, Praha, AÚV KSCˇ fond 19/1, a. j. 3398.
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